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1: INTRODUCTION
There continues to be some obsession with the question of whether or not Australian
ports are more or less competitive than each other or than their international
counterparts; and benchmarking exercises, too often seriously flawed, are nonetheless
seen to be essential in stimulating reform. 1
The focus on 'competitiveness' is, however, unfortunate; 2 and the question of whether
this port or that port is more competitive or less competitive than another is diverting.
The critical issue is not 'competitiveness' but productivity; and the central task is to
understand what it is that 'drives' productivity in individual ports.  How well one port
compares with another is not without interest; but comparison is a relatively blunt
instrument of change, much less of reform.  Efficiency changes in individual ports
are best determined by comparing the system with itself under a range of
realistically defined scenarios.  Change is almost invariably incremental and is
most likely to be based on fine tuning and adjustments to operating rules and
parameters of one sort or another rather than on radical restructuring.
This paper focuses on one aspect of port productivity  -  stevedoring productivity at
container terminals.  Moreover, its particular interest is not in the levels of productivity
at individual terminals in Australia per se but in the diagnosis of what it is that 'drives'
productivity levels 3; and what steps can be taken to increase them.
This interest has been sharpened by a decline in productivity levels at some but not all
Australian terminals through 1994 and 1995  -  though whether or not these declines
are part of a longer term trend or reflect particular circumstances  -  including an
exceptional level of politicisation of labour issues in 1995  -  will become clearer in due
course.4
In any case such productivity declines prompt the somewhat more general
question of why it is that, in spite of an extensive reform program, stevedoring
productivity remains at such low levels.
It is this question which the Western Australia Department of Transport posed in
September 1995 and which this paper addresses.
1.1 Focusing The Issues
Conventional wisdom suggests that a range of factors may be responsible for low
productivity levels; but endemic low productivity would seem to suggest structural
problems of one form or another rather than short-term mismatches.  Is low
productivity a function of inadequate or insufficient infrastructure, for example?  Or is
it more likely to be some function of the way in which the available infrastructure
resources are allocated?
Similarly, are manning levels too high - or too low?  Excess labour resources will
inflate costs per unit of output; but with waterfront reform, labour levels have been set
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low for a rising market.  How does the stevedoring firm cope, with variable demand
with a small core of permanent employees?  Does it meet excess demand for labour
with short-term casual labour?  Or does it recycle its permanent labour through extra
shift work or overtime?  Or with a mix of both?  Again, is it the quantum of the labour
input that is critical?  Or is it the allocation mechanisms that are the problem?
If productivity is low and wage levels high then per unit production costs will be
higher than appropriate.  Is the issue to reduce wage levels?  Or is it to fix wages in
such a way as to achieve high productivity?  Is the central problem not the level of the
wage but the way in which the wage is set?
The charge that the lack of competition on the waterfront constrains productivity is
well-worn.  Duopolistie competition imposes severe limits and is often described as the
worst market structure for the user.  But the need for economies of scale in container
handling operations leaves the market structure options in low volume scenarios very
limited indeed.
But is the key issue the number of players in the market place?  Or is it the rigidities
locked into labour market contractual arrangements in the market place?  Or is it the
way in which individual firms organise labour inputs?
In the following sections we will focus more sharply on what we think are the central
issues in understanding endemic low productivity in Australian container terminals.
1.2 Structure Of The Paper
In the following section we seek to identify the fundamental principles in the
relationship between enterprise employment and competition and between enterprise
employment and productivity; and in so doing highlight the crucial research focus  -
that of managing variable demand.
In Section 3 we look at the way stevedoring firms deal with the problem of variable
demand; and identify underlying problems.  Section 4 suggests alternate options and
examines the characteristics of CTAL's Productivity Employment Proposal or PEP
Scheme.
In Section 5 we focus on productivity issues at the Fremantle terminals; and Section 6
summarises the arguments and notes the conclusions reached.
2: ENTERPRISE EMPLOYMENT, ENTERPRISE AGREEMENTS
AND
PRODUCTIVITY:  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
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In March 1989 the Inter-State Commission handed down its recommendations for
waterfront reform in Australia.  At '... the heart of ... (its) proposed waterfront industry
plan' was '... the modification of employment arrangements in the stevedoring
industry'.5  More particularly, the Commission proposed that '... the current industry-
wide arrangements, including levies and labour pools, be progressively replaced by
enterprise employment.  This will enhance competition, bring more pressure to bear on
managers to manage effectively and to control costs, and encourage employees to
identify with the enterprise'. 6  Enterprises were, in fact, to '... take responsibility for the
employer obligations normally met by enterprises in other industries' 7; and enterprise
agreements between employers and unions were to be established.  In Australian
container terminals these agreements, nurtured and approved by the Waterfront
Industry Reform Authority (WIRA) under the In-Principle Agreement (IPA), were set
in place by the end of 1991. 8
This background is by now a more-or-less familiar one; but our special concern in this
context is the quite critical issue of what, in effect, is the relationship between
enterprise employment and productivity?  And what precisely are the mechanisms by
which enterprise employment can, as the Commission suggested, 'enhance
competition'?
In our view, to understand these issues will allow us to formulate appropriate
strategies and policies for productivity growth  -  and enhanced competition.
2.1 How Well Do Firms Compete In An Industry?
How effectively do stevedoring firms compete in the container handling industry?
What is it that makes some firms in the industry more competitive  -  or more efficient
or more productive or more profitable  -  than others?
Porter argues that the way in which firms compete in an industry  -  or what
competitive strategy they adopt  -  reflects two particularly important conditions  -
• the structure of the industry in which the firm is competing  -  or its '...
underlying economic and technical characteristics'; and
• how the firm positions itself within that industry  -  what particular
advantage it might exploit (its competitive advantage) and what
competitive scope it will adopt. 9
We take up these two points in reverse order.
2.2 Enterprise Employment, Positioning and Productivity
The restructuring of employment arrangements on the Australian waterfront  -  from
industry-wide labour arrangements to enterprise employment  -  was of particular
significance because it impacted directly on the individual stevedoring firm's ability to
position itself in the container handling market.  For the first time the individual
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operator had the possibility of controlling the firm's labour inputs  -  the number,
structure, costs, the way in which labour was allocated to tasks and its adjustment to
demand fluctuations.  At least, hypothetically, that is what control implies; in fact, as
we shall note, continuing rigidities in the labour market 'constrain' the degree of
control and flexibility of the individual operator.  In any case, control over labour
inputs adds to the firm's ability to '... organise and perform discrete activities' 10; and
how well the individual firm organises its labour and capital inputs to generate outputs
-  or, more simply, the levels of productivity it achieves  -  will determine its ability to
compete in the industry.
The ability to exert control over labour inputs is important in any industry; but it is
particularly important in the stevedoring industry because it is an industry which is
characterised by
• significant variability of demand as well as
• often high levels of uncertainty of demand.
The actual number of ships  -  as well as trucks and rail wagons  -  arriving at the
terminal at any point in time  -  varies markedly as does the volume of cargo presenting
itself either from the ship or landside modes.  Moreover, despite the scheduled nature
of liner services, actual arrival times are often characterised by wide fluctuations and,
not unusually, random arrival patterns particularly for the ship 'population' using the
terminal.  Rail arrivals are more predictable but truck arrivals may be uncertain; and
trade volumes may fluctuate between wide limits.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the point.  The individual histograms, computed for an earlier
study11 of the CTAL terminal at Port Botany, indicate the variability over a 3-month
period, on a daily basis, of
• the number of ships alongside the terminal;
• the number of import and export containers handled; and
• the number of containers received at and dispatched from the terminal by
road and rail.
The most critical issue in determining productivity levels for stevedoring firms in
container handling operations is how effectively the firm deals with, or
manages, variability in demand  -  how effectively it allocates its labour and
capital inputs.
If this is the case the research priority in this study is to determine precisely what
mechanisms and procedures are available in order to manage variable demand; and
whether or not they are appropriate; and if they are not whether there are better ways.
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2.3 Stevedoring Firms and the Structure of the Industry
We have argued that enterprise employment has provided firms with the possibility of
controlling labour inputs; that such control is critical given the high level of variability
of demand that characterises the industry; that the productivity of the firm will depend
on how well it manages this variability of demand; and that if the firm manages this
well its high levels of productivity will serve to deliver it a competitive edge within the
industry.
Industries differ, however, in the degree to which they are 'conducive' to growth and
profitability  -  or in the levels of competition that they sustain.
Porter's views are again useful and he argues that the nature of competition within the
industry framework will be a function of the relative strengths of what he calls 'the five
competitive forces that determine industry competition'  -  the threat of new entrants,
the bargaining power of suppliers and buyers, the threat of substitute products or
services and the degree of rivalry among existing competitors.  Briefly, the following
summary is illuminating  -
'The five competitive forces determine industry profitability because they
shape the prices firms can charge, the costs they have to bear, and the
investment required to compete in the industry.  The threat of new
entrants limits the overall profit potential in the industry, because new
entrants bring new capacity and seek market share, pushing down
margins.  Powerful buyers or suppliers bargain away the profits for
themselves.  Fierce competitive rivalry erodes profits by requiring higher
costs of competing (such as for advertising, sales expenses, or R&D) or
by passing on profits to customers in the form of lower prices.  The
presence of close substitute products limits the price competitors can
charge without inducing substitution and eroding industry volume'. 12
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Figure 2.1:  Variability in the number of ships alongside and in containers
handled at the CTAL terminal over a 3 month period
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Certainly, the stevedoring industry is not without its share of structural problems 13; and
the duopoly which has characterised the industry for some time is seen to be restrictive
and less than ideal  -
'... a duopoly is for users the worst of all market structures.  There is the
illusion of competition but not the substance.  Price competition is
eschewed because it will inevitably be met by retaliatory action.  Non-
price competition may be vigorous but tends to increase costs and
economic rents rather than reduce them.  Duopolists share a common
interest in delivering economic rents to shareholders, managers and
perhaps employees.  Provided cost structure and market access are not
markedly different, they are likely to split the market.  Hence, there is
neither the rationalisation that might flow from monopoly nor the
efficiency and innovation that could be expected from a plurality of
operators'.14
Nonetheless, note that there have been significant declines in box handling rates at the
major terminals over the last decade  -  at CTAL, for example, from about $265 per
TEU to about $200 per TEU in 1995.
Enterprise employment was seen by the Inter-State Commission as a strategy to
overcome '... union monopolies over the supply of labour'15  -  exemplifying, in Porter's
terms, the strong bargaining power of suppliers; and the Waterfront Industry Reform
authority in its Final Report in 1992 declared, as a 'Major Achievement', the creation of
'... a fully competitive market structure'. 16
But it is clear that the bargaining power of unions continues to impose rigidities within
the labour market and detract from a 'fully competitive' market place.  So-called
'pattern bargaining'  -  union bargaining to impose the same conditions on different
firms  -  suggests constraints on the effectiveness of enterprise employment.
2.4 Summary
In structural terms, the container terminal market in Australian capital city ports is
characterised for the most part by a duopoly.  In smaller ports  -  if not in Sydney and
Melbourne  -  this market structure almost certainly delivers higher per unit costs than
might otherwise be the case with much larger throughputs.  The charge that it is a
'cosy duopoly', as some suggest, is simplistic in the present context of tight market and
trade conditions, cost sensitivities of shippers and the overviewing role of regulatory
bodies  -  formerly, the Prices Surveillance Authority and the Trade Practices
Commission, more recently merged as the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission.
The labour market, until the implementation of WIRA reforms characterised by strong
monopoly control, has now some semblance of a more competitive structure with
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enterprise employment; but a series of stoppages through 1995 demonstrated that
significant rigidities still exist in the market place.
The research has shown, too, that rigidities exist at the level of the individual firm and
impact on attempts by firms to position themselves in the market; so that whilst EBAs
have provided the framework for operational flexibility and control over labour
inputs individual firms have continued to operate under significant constraints.
In the following sections we explore these factors.
3: MANAGING VARIABLE DEMAND:  THE STATUS QUO
The central problem of the stevedoring firm is that of meeting variable demand  -  how
to allocate labour and capital (and other) resources in such a way as to optimise costs
against often marked, short-run variations in demand for berth space, equipment,
storage, interface transport operations, information and manpower.  Such a problem is
a quite different one from that for most manufacturing industries where, though
demand fluctuations are not uncommon, supply responses are less immediate and more
easily programmed.
How do stevedoring firms meet this variable demand?  And how are Enterprise
Agreements framed to meet this problem?
3.1 The Key Issues
There are three critical and interrelated factors which structure the way in which
stevedoring firms are currently meeting variations in demand  -
• the use of Overtime to meet 'above normal' demand;
• the employment, under current 'Order of Engagement' rules, of Permanent
employees on Overtime loadings or 'penalty rates'; and
• a wage fixing mechanism that defines wages in terms, in effect, of 'time on
the job' or 'time spent'.
We examine each of these in more detail.
3.1.1 Overtime as the key strategy :  For stevedoring firms the negotiation of
EBAs with labour unions and the ACTU within the reform framework provided by the
Waterfront Industry Reform Authority provided a unique opportunity to 'downsize' the
labour force and adjust labour supply to existing  -  or projected or at least most
preferred  -  demand levels.
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Almost certainly, however, labour levels remained somewhat higher than might have
been the case in an unconstrained market; nonetheless, no better opportunity for
labour-shedding had provided itself and firms drastically reduced labour requirements.
They were also acutely aware of the fact that despite some loosening of the 'no
redundancy' stand, assumed by the Unions over a long period of time, shedding labour
under normal circumstances was, though not impossible, very difficult; and that, as a
result, labour supply levels of permanent labour were 'inflexible'.  Clearly, too, the high
costs of maintaining a high-cost labour force under conditions of uncertain demand
kept pressure on firms to minimise labour supply levels.
The upshot of these pressures has been that 'above normal' demands for labour on the
terminals have been met by the assignment of overtime  -  largely, but not only, by
Permanents in the terminal workforces (for reasons we shall note below).
The impacts of the 'overtime' strategy have been
• very high wages for a proportion of the Permanents  -  with wage levels
above $75,000 and in some cases above $90,000 quoted in discussions;
• long hours on the job  -  with 60 hours per week not unusual; and with
• concerns expressed about safety; and with
• about one third of stevedoring firms' labour budgets attributable to
overtime payments.
Clearly, there is an upper limit to the amount of overtime that can be worked by the
Permanents in terminal workforces; and there is now concern in some if not most
terminals that even with the relatively small increases in demand over the past year or
so the present situation is increasingly unsustainable  -  in terms of both the workforce
itself and increasing cost pressures from the 'overtime strategy'.
3.1.2 Order of engagement, permanents and 'penalty rates':  The large
proportion of overtime work required is a central factor in the high-cost equation; but
it is not the only one.
Union policy has underlined the position that the Australian waterfront should be
manned by a permanent, fully-trained and responsible workforce; and that most, if not
all, work should be carried out by that group.  The use of Supplementary labour, or
Casuals, is therefore seen to be undesirable.  (Less formally, there is also a strong view
which sees Casuals  -  often former waterfront labourers made redundant  -  as 'double-
dipping' and no longer requiring or deserving of employment).  Clearly, too, the more
extensive use of Supplementaries is seen by the existing Permanent labour force to be a
factor in reducing overtime and the high overtime payments associated with it.
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This general policy stand has translated itself into, and is reflected in, the 'Order of
Engagement of Employees' that is an important element in the firms' EBAs or EAs  -
or, at least, has been to date.  The following note quotes the relevant section from the
1994-1996 CTAL Enterprise Agreement  -
"18.1 Order of Engagement of Employees
Subject to the skill requirements of CTAL and constraints imposed by
the notification times in Clause 22 of this Agreement, CTAL
requirements shall be met on a shift-by-shift basis in the following
order:
Order of Engagement of Employees
Monday to Friday
1. Rostered permanent employees
2. AVC Trainees (subject to skills)
3. GWEs up to the limit of the guarantee
4. Surplus White Bay employees
5. Permanent employees on double-headers (limit of two non-consecutive
per week in accordance with Clause 23.2.4)
6. Permanent employees on rostered days off (limit of one per week)
7. GWEs beyond guarantee
8. Supplementary employees
9. Other double headers in the above order
Saturday and Sunday
1. Rostered Permanent Employees
2. Permanent employees on overtime shifts
3. AVC employees on overtime shifts (subject  to skills)
4. GWEs
5. Surplus White Bay employees
6. Permanent employees on double headers (limit of two non-consecutive
per week in accordance with Clause 23.2.4)
7. Supplementary employees
8. Other double headers in the above order
In the event Conaust White Bay is unable to provide a list of transfer
employees, the shifts and the duration for which they are available in
sufficient time to allow CTAL to carry out its allocation, then the
abovementioned sequence shall be followed without the need to
engage transfer employees.
For the purpose of this clause "surplus White Bay employees" means
employees who in their normal roster position at White Bay are
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available but not required to work at White Bay and are suitably
qualified to carry out the work at CTAL."
Source:  CTAL Enterprise Agreement, 1994-1996, pp15-16.
Note that 'Supplementary employees' have very low priority of employment in both
week-day and weekend work.  More recently there has been some relaxation of these
priorities; but for the most part the present above-normal demand condition is met by
Permanents on Overtime or Penalty rates.  The alternate strategy would be, of
course, to soak up demand with Supplementary labour on regular shifts without
Overtime loadings.
3.1.3 A wage structure problem?  There is a third factor which is perhaps both a
result or an outcome of, as well as a cause of, the present Overtime strategy and its
associated problems  -  it is the way in which the wage is a function of time spent on
the job.  Note that under 'above normal' demand conditions wage structure as follows -
WAGE   = [ Shift ]   + [ Overtime ]   + [ Productivity ]
   Rate    Loading    Loading
In this structure we note, further, a number of characteristics
• the Overtime Loading is, in fact, the most important element in
supplementing wages; and
• the Productivity Loading may or may not add to the wage level and in any
case it is quantitatively much less attractive than an Overtime payment (see
Appendix 1).
Given this structure, it is apparent that the inducement to spend time on the job is far
more attractive than the inducement to be productive.  In effect, this structure
rewards low productivity by extending the time it takes to perform tasks; and
penalises, in dollar terms, high productivity.
The way in which the wage is structured is, in itself, a powerful deterrent to high
productivity  -  intuitively and arguably the precise opposite structure to that which is
required in a service operation.
Even under the normal working conditions of a container terminal this wage
structure will limit productivity.  But note that such a structure also ensures high
wage outcomes in post-stoppage or post-strike situations.  Unless shipowners and
cargo owners are indifferent to delays to ships and therefore cargoes  -  a most
unlikely situation  -  the excess demand created by the stoppage and the urgency
of clearing both ships and cargo effectively guarantee high wage outcomes
through the creation of the need for high levels of Overtime; and under such
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circumstances it is likely that the wage will be further supplemented by a
Productivity Loading in the higher range!
3.2 Unsatisfactory Outcomes?
Clearly, the Enterprise Agreement frameworks within which container terminals are
currently operating are quite inadequate and are, in fact, inducing and encouraging low
productivity and high costs.
Is there a better way?  Is it possible to link wages to productivity rather than time?  We
will explore these possibilities in Section 4; but in the following sections we note
briefly some empirical evidence of current terminal operations under existing EBAs or
EAs.
3.3 Some Empirical Evidence
The data in the following tables have been abstracted from detailed records of CTAL
terminal operations over a 24-day period within the period January to March 1995.
The period was seen to be representative of the operations of the terminal and was
used as the basis of a detailed simulation for defining optimal operating conditions
under a range of productivity scenarios (see Appendix 2).
In this context, the following tables indicate some of the characteristics of present
operating conditions  -
• Table 3.1  -  is an overview table.  The general impression is one of
considerable variability in the number of vessels, the number of containers
handled, the number of cranes used and the number of containers handled
per crane hour.  This last indicator suggests that only in 1 in 4 shifts did the
containers handled per crane hour exceed 15 and only in 2 shifts of 72 did
rates equal 20 or more.  In numerous shifts, relatively small numbers of
boxes are handled by what appears to be crane over-capacity to give low
numbers of containers per crane hour  -  4 cranes for 4 ships for 178 boxes
at a rate of 6.4 containers per crane hour (Day 1, Evening Shift); or 3
cranes for 2 ships for 117 boxes at a rate of 5.6 containers per crane
hour(Day 22, Evening Shift);
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• Table 3.2  -  groups some of the data used in the previous table to indicate
the range of container handling rates by the number of ships and cranes
involved.  The results are mixed  -  for example
- 3 ships alongside using 2 cranes achieved rates of between 8.6 and
18.1 boxes
- 3 ships alongside using 3 cranes achieved rates of between 7.1 and
15.9 boxes, and
- 3 ships using 4 cranes achieved rates of between 10 and 16.9 boxes
per crane hour.
• Table 3.3  -  the average number of containers handled per shift is notably
larger than that for Day and Evening Shifts  -  which are similar, though the
Evening Shift shows greater variability about the average.
• Table 3.4  -  the average handling rate is also higher on the Midnight Shift
than on the other two shifts; and again there is greater variability about the
average of Evening Shift rates.
Table 3.2 :  Containers handled per crane hour by number of ships
alongside and number of cranes used
Number of ships
alongside
on any one shift
Number of cranes used Number of
ships using
n cranes
1 2 3 4
Minimum/maximum values for
containers handled per crane hour
1 - 6.2 9.4 - 11
17.7
2 - 12.6 5.6 15.6 23
22.1
3 - 8.6 and 7.1 10.0 28
18.1 15.9 16.9
4 - 9.4 12.1 6.4 7
13.4 13.4
Number of shifts in
which n cranes
were used
0 15 40 13
Source:  Table 3.1
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Table 3.1 : Containers* handled per crane hour
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Table 3.3 :  Containers handled per shift
SHIFT
DAY M D E
1 341 254 178
2 312 255 238
3 355 206 326
4 255 174 0
5 0 0 184
6 248 176 349
7 419 246 338
8 472 340 312
9 275 287 274
10 454 175 242
11 208 210 207
12 246 198 208
13 220 242 176
14 436 199 246
15 334 279 131
16 427 272 261
17 323 202 282
18 340 309 120
19 232 238 253
20 407 301 290
21 435 251 258
22 283 182 117
23 212 87 130
24 160 0 150
Average 322 231 229
Standard
Deviation
90 56 70
Source:  Table 3.1
3.4 Summary
We have suggested in this chapter that the central problem for a stevedoring firm is
that of meeting variable demand in a cost-effective way; and we have argued further
that the way in which firms  -  and particularly CTAL  -  allocate labour and equipment
to meet variable demand within the framework of the current EBA or EA raises
serious issues.  Indeed, it is likely that even with modest increases in demand for
terminal services the EBA framework may become increasingly unsustainable  -
though we have not been in a position to evaluate cost structures.
Empirical evidence confirms less than optimal operations.
Is there a better way?  We turn to this question in the following section.
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Table 3.4 :  Crane handling rates by shift (containers per hour)
SHIFT
DAY M D E
1 16.2 12.1 6.4
2 11.1 12.1 11.3
3 16.9 9.8 15.5
4 12.1 12.4 0
5 0 0 13.1
6 17.7 12.6 16.6
7 20.0 11.7 16.1
8 16.9 16.2 14.9
9 9.8 13.7 13.1
10 16.2 8.3 17.3
11 9.9 10.0 9.9
12 11.7 9.4 9.9
13 10.5 11.5 12.6
14 15.6 9.5 11.7
15 15.9 10.0 9.4
16 15.3 13.0 12.4
17 11.5 9.6 13.4
18 12.1 22.1 8.6
19 8.3 11.3 18.1
20 14.5 14.3 13.8
21 15.5 12.0 12.3
22 13.5 13.0 5.6
23 15.1 6.2 9.3
24 11.4 0 7.1
Average 13.8 12.9 12.1
Standard
Deviation
2.95 3.2 3.4
Source:  Table 3.1
Productivity of Australian Container Terminals: Some Critical Issues
Robinson & Everett
17
4: MANAGING VARIABLE DEMAND: ALTERNATIVE
FRAMEWORKS
4.1 The Crucial Issues
Why is productivity low in container terminals?  Certainly the 'culture' of the
waterfront remains a powerful inhibitor ; and a number of other factors which we noted
earlier are not unimportant.  But the overriding, critical factor is that high
productivity in current wage structuring is significantly less valued than time.  Wage
outcomes are, in effect, a function of time on the job (and the penalty rates that are
attracted to 'excessive' time or overtime) rather than on how productively that time is
used.  The situation is that
• a small number of Permanent employees
• working at low levels of productivity induced by a wage system rewarding
time on the job not productivity; and
• unwilling to substitute Supplementary or casual labour at standard shift
rates and/or penalty rates except under quite specific conditions effectively
locks the work task into high levels of overtime; and into low productivity.
In current wage determinations
Wage   =   the Shift Loading   +   an Overtime Loading and/or
a Productivity Bonus
The key problem converges on how to handle overtime?  Can it be eliminated or
minimised in a cost-effective way?
4.2 The Options?
4.2.1 Adding labour:  Clearly, and assuming static productivity levels, it would be
possible to
• add more Permanents to the workforce;
• add more Supplementaries; or
• add a cost-effective mix of both Permanent and Supplementary labour.
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Adding labour will add to fixed costs of the firm; but, given the difficulty under present
conditions which firms have in shedding Permanent labour, corporate policy has been
to minimise labour inputs.  Adding Supplementary labour or casuals is attractive to the
firm; but not to the Union which opposes the ' casualisation' of the waterfront and
which sees wages erosion with increases in employee numbers.
4.2.2 Enhancing productivity:  Achieving higher levels of productivity will
reduce and possibly eliminate overtime.  Clearly, there would be some trade off
between productivity, labour resources, other resources and levels of technology, and
costs.
In this scenario, the issue is how to enhance productivity?  The simple answer is to pay
for it  -  to value productivity more highly than time spent on the job; to make wages a
function of productivity.  Under present circumstances, in which
Wage   =   Shift Loading   +   Overtime Loading and/or
     a Productivity Bonus
there would need to be an adjustment of the numbers employed and the productivity
bonus to ensure the elimination or near-elimination of overtime loadings.  In effect,
this would mean a significant increase in the levels of productivity bonus and may
also require increases to the standard shift Loading.
4.2.3 Adjusting to changes in demand:  There will of course, be upper limits to
productivity and in conditions of rising demand an increase in labour input will be
required beyond some quantifiable threshold.
Under conditions of falling demand, however, the firm may need to shed labour  -  or,
in one way or another, reduce labour costs.  Falling wage levels will disadvantage
employees ; so that wage instability for employees and excess labour from the firm's
point of view will create difficulties.  For the firm, some flexibility is possible if the use
of Supplementaries can be varied.
But the question of adjustment to falling demand underlines two extremely important
issues  -
• the desirability of wage stability, as well as high productivity performance,
for employees; and
• the need for the firm to be able to adjust its labour costs under conditions
of falling demand.
Neither of these problems is dealt with effectively under present EBA arrangements.
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4.3 CTAL's Productivity Employment Proposal:  the PEP Scheme17
In 1995 P&O Ports developed its so-called PEP Scheme, essentially for its operations
at the Port Botany CTAL terminal though the basis of the scheme is thought to have
potential for application in other terminals.
In effect, the scheme has recognised that the central issue for stevedoring productivity
is overtime  -  and that '... overtime earnings (have driven) the cycle of inefficiency and
excessive hours on the job'.  Poor productivity  -  low container handling rates, high
berth occupancy, vessel queuing, long waiting times for trucks  -  on the one hand and
high costs on the other were seen to be unsustainable in the medium and longer term.
As stated, then
'... the aim of the project is to enable the workforce to earn relatively
the same income as they presently do, whilst providing the incentive to
perform in the most efficient (time, cost and safe) manner.  The scheme
rewards productivity and precludes workers earning a large percentage
of their income from overtime'.
Effectively, the scheme substitutes productivity increases for overtime.
4.3.1 Determining resource needs:  The scheme is based on a rigorous analysis
of the actual operating conditions of the terminal over a 3-month period January to
March 1995; and a simulation of a 24-day period within these months under a range of
assumptions to determine more effective patterns of response allocation, including
labour requirements and assignment.
In effect, the simulation problem was to determine what labour and equipment
requirements  -  both in number and operational terms  -  were 'necessary to perform at
an industry-acceptable rate of 24 containers per crane hour'?
A number of assumptions were made, including the following
• terminal operations were over a 24-hour day;
• crane rates were based on working 7 hours of an 8 hour shift;
• ship arrival times were the same as actual times over the period;
• different ship servicing rates  -  24 containers/crane hour assumed for fast-
working ships; 13 containers/crane hour for slow-working ships (or 168
lifts and 91 lifts/hour per shift respectively);
• ships were capable of working all cranes assigned; and
• could be worked for the whole of a shift;
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• equipment was available and operational as required; and
• labour was determined on an as-needs basis.
Table 4.1 indicates the significant differences in labour requirements under
assumptions of higher productivity  -  over the 24-day period the average manshift
requirement under the present, actual allocation was twice that of a 'high productivity'
alternative; and showed less variation about the Mean or Average value  -  or in effect
much less flexibility.
Simulation results also showed more effective use of cranes and equipment.
4.3.2 An effective roster to deliver efficient resource allocation :  Final labour
requirements were calculated from the model and further analysis was required to
define an appropriate roster.  The outcome was
• a 16-week roster cycle;
• a 26-hour shift coverage (two eight hour shifts and one 10 hour shift);
• a 35-hour per week balanced roster;
• 45 days off in 16 weeks;
• 2 rostered weeks off in 16 weeks;
• 10 full weekends off in 16 weeks.
These characteristics are shown in Table 4.2.
4.3.3 The wage outcome:  In an attempt to preserve wage levels similar to those
currently achieved, to provide some wage stability, to reward productivity and to
eliminate (or minimise) overtime payment the wage structure has been determined as
Wage   =  An Average Weekly Rate   +   Productivity Loading
The Average Weekly Rate (AWR) has been determined at about the average rank or
Grade Level of the workforce at the terminal as in 1995  -  initially, at least, an
annualised salary level of about $48,000.  This AWR will vary depending on the skill
level of the employee  -  now ranked into four skill levels with, for example, a Quay
Crane Driver classified at the highest skill level.
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Table 4.1 :  Labour (manshifts) required under actual and
'optimal' conditions
Day Actual Manshifts
Used
Manshifts Required
Under   'Optimal'
Conditions
1 269 161
2 266 163
3 155 63
4 92 3
5 209 98
6 267 145
7 242 153
8 264 155
9 280 194
10 286 131
11 264 86
12 228 118
13 238 133
14 256 144
15 258 175
16 282 123
17 329 126
18 308 59
19 250 145
20 260 189
21 256 107
22 230 109
23 226 108
24 226 78
Average Standard
Deviation
248
48
124
44
* Shaded areas represent weekends
Table 4.2: The characteristics of the roster
WEEK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
M E I D X D/E I D X E I X E X I D/E X
T E I X D D/E I X X E I D E D/E I X X
W E I X D D/E I X X E I D E D/E I X X
T E X I D D/E X I X E I D E D/E X I X
F E X I D D/E X I X E I D E D/E X I X
SAT X D/E I X X D/E I X X X X X X D/E I X
SUN X D/E I X X D/E I X X X X X X D/E I X
* D/E = AN 8 HOUR DAY OR EVENING SHIFT
* E = AN 8 HOUR EVENING SHIFT
* I = AN 8 HOUR TOTALLY IRREGULAR SHIFT
* D = A VARIABLE START LONG SHIFT
* X = DAYS OFF
The Productivity loading will be paid from the balance of the total annual budget for
labour less the fixed wages bill  -  a pool equivalent, in effect, to the expected earnings
in overtime payments.
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The pool will be split to reward productivity
• in the receival/delivery operations; and
• in the container crane handling operations.
Productivity loadings will be paid
• for crane rates (containers per hour) between 15 and 30, with a maximum
loading from the pool payable for a crane handling rate of 24 containers
per hour.  For higher crane handling rates (from 25 to 30 containers per
hour) a 'super bonus' will be paid  -  funded by reduction in penalties levied
by shipping lines for poor performance.  For slow working vessels a crane
handling rate of 15 containers per hour will attract the maximum loading
from the pool;
• for truck handling times (THT), a bonus will be paid for times between 30
minutes and 15 minutes, with maximum loading from the pool available for
handling trucks in 20 minutes.
4.3.4 Complementary changes:  In an attempt to support higher productivity
other changes are planned or have been implemented, including
• the redesign of yard layout and traffic flows;
• installation of a new, computerised planning and operating programme;
• the introduction of Rubber-Tyred Gantry cranes (RTGs) to handle
containers in the yard; and
• the installation of two additional quay cranes to handle ship/shore
operations.
4.3.5 The downside of the scheme:  There are a number of difficulties with the
PEP Scheme and we note the following  -
• It is a high cost strategy.  The scheme is designed to maintain wage levels
(or earnings) at about current levels  -  which may average over $75,000
per year with some employees earning over $90,000.  It is, of course,
possible to set a lower Average Weekly Rate and raise the productivity
levels at which significant bonus payments are available in order to reduce
earning outcomes.  Note, too, that in the implementation of the Scheme
Overtime and Overtime Payments must be eliminated if it is to be
successful.
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• Total labour cost levels would remain at current levels.   There may be
some difficulties in keeping labour budget levels static  -  or relatively
static; though clearly there is considerable benefit beyond the short term in
a relatively constant labour budget level.
Note that if labour costs remain more-or-less constant there would be, nonetheless,
spinoffs in
• reduced ship turnround time with increased productivity;
• reduced cargo time in port; and
• reduced truck turnround times and shorter waiting times.
These benefits may or may not attract some pricing premium at the terminal (and/or
elsewhere); but there are potential benefits for shippers, shipowners and trucking firms.
For the terminal operator, higher productivity would mean more effective use of berth
space, equipment and storage space and could be expected to result in delayed
investment in plant and equipment.
• The problem of a fall-off in trade.  Under a PEP Scheme the Average
Weekly Rate and the Productivity bonus could be unaffected whether trade
increases or decreases (for whatever reason).  Under these conditions the
firm would find revenue falling but costs remaining constant  -  with
options to increase prices or decrease labour costs.  In this scenario, the
ability of the firm to shed labour becomes critical; and whilst it may be able
to reduce the input of Supplementary or casual labour its ability to reduce
Permanent labour could be difficult under present circumstances.
• Other problems.  There may be a range of problems associated with the
details of the scheme rather than with its broad structure.  Certainly it is
possible under the scheme to adjust the levels at which the productivity
bonus is paid, as noted earlier  -  so that, for example, crane handling rates
of 20 containers per hour may be seen as a realistic minimum base for
productivity payments, rather than 15 or 18 containers per hour.
We are not aware of some of the more detailed definitions in the scheme;
but it appears likely that truck handling times, for example, could be
manipulated by holding trucks out of the yard until they can be handled
at the rate of 20 minutes, which attracts maximum bonus.  (The truck
handling time refers to the time elapsed between the truck entering and
leaving the yard.  The shipper is, of course, interested in minimising the
total time which a truck spends at the terminal  -  not simply the time spent
in the yard!).
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4.3.6 The upside of the scheme:  There are a number of positive points that
should be made about the scheme  -
• it is an innovative attempt to address the critical problem of overtime and
overtime loadings in terminal productivity;
• it has attempted to address the issue of wage structuring and to relate wage
reward to productivity not time;
• the scheme is built upon a rigorous analysis of the actual operations of a
terminal, the nature of demand, resource availability, corporate and labour
policies, wage and productivity expectations; it has, in fact, attempted to
define possibilities rather than cope with constraints;
• it has determined alternative ways to overcome some of the labour market
rigidities which have persisted in the EBA environment  -  including, for
example, the Order of Engagement and the length of shifts.
Not all terminals would be able to adopt the PEP scheme as it is currently defined; but
the process by which the scheme has been developed and the issues which is addresses
serves as a useful framework for trying to solve the productivity problem.  Each
terminal and port is different and will have different cost profiles; and there
ought to be no expectation of portability  -  at least in detail and final form; but
each terminal needs to assess the way in which it determines its productivity
outcomes.  In a competitive terminals market wage levels (including the Average
Weekly Rate and the Productivity Bonus) must reflect the costs/revenue equation
of the particular terminal  -  not a uniquely defined and uniformly imposed wage
level.
4.4 Summary
We have argued in this section that the key problem which stevedoring firms have in
meeting variable demand is the way in which they are dealing with Overtime and
Overtime loadings.  Current wage determination locks in low productivity by valuing
time spent on the job more highly than productivity.
The addition of more labour resources will raise fixed costs , dilute employee pay levels
and will not address the issue of wage as a function of time on the job.
Achieving higher levels of productivity could reduce or eliminate Overtime  -  so the
problem becomes that of how to enhance productivity.  The answer is, in effect, to
value productivity more highly than time on the job; so that restructuring the wage
fixing mechanism becomes a key strategy.
The CTAL Productivity Employment Proposal offers a way ahead and it has been
discussed in some detail, with an added note about its strengths and weaknesses.
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5: THE FREMANTLE TERMINALS:  SIMILAR PROBLEMS OR A 
SPECIAL CASE?
5.1 Wider Influences?
A regional location that is about as far removed from the commercial and demographic
heartland of the nation as is possible does not confer immunity from those factors
which determine waterfront productivity levels in east coast and other national ports.
In fact, the terminals in the Port of Fremantle are effectively integrated into national
shipping networks and into port operations in a number of ways including the
following:
• Corporate linkages tie the two terminal operators into policies and
practices that are determined at the national head offices in the eastern
states; so, despite the ability to act independently in a range of matters,
clearly what happens in Sydney and Melbourne and elsewhere will have
important implications for what happens in Fremantle;
• Operational linkages  -  first port of call eastbound and last port of call
westbound  -  are also important; and corporate efforts to capture market
share by handling the same ships in different ports further strengthen
patterns of integration;
• Labour market structures   -  union structures, policies and practices  -
also serve to restrict independence and impose conformity of action and
practice.
Nonetheless, despite this pervasive 'national determinism' what happens locally or
regionally is not unimportant.
5.2 The Regional Context
The port community in Fremantle is somewhat smaller than that in Sydney or
Melbourne; and it tends to be well established and cohesive.  Not surprisingly then, the
high degree of politicisation of labour disputes on the waterfront (or with
implications for waterfront labour and operations) that occurred during 1995 had quite
serious implications for the terminals' workforce.  In particular, the attempt to
introduce new stevedoring operations into the port, the protracted Stateships problems
and the CRA-related labour issues served to alienate the workforce and Government  -
and by association, the workforce and management.
For much of 1995 then  -  if not for somewhat longer  -  terminals operation and
productivity were severely impacted by events quite outside the direct control of
terminal managements.  Certainly, already difficult and protracted negotiations for new
Enterprise Agreements were made even more difficult.
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Quite apart from these contextual problems the Fremantle terminals do have a number
of specific conditions that are important in determining productivity levels.
• Problems associated with infrastructure and equipment:  Both
terminals have operated for some considerable time with their individual
operations carried on across unconsolidated terminals.  Under these
conditions it is hardly surprising that it has been difficult to achieve
operating economies and economies of scale.
Note also that the terminals have been operating with gantry cranes that
date back in some cases to the establishment of the Seatainer terminal, for
example, and served the original vessels in the Australia-Europe container
trade.  Other handling equipment has been 'imported' from other ports and
refitted  -  with less than satisfactory results, as in the case of rubber- tyred
gantries on the P&O Ports berth and ex Port Botany equipment at the
Patricks terminal.  (Severe damage to the gantry crane on the P&O Ports
terminal in 1994 after a ship-related accident also impacted directly on
productivity  -  though this was hardly a predictable event!).
The decisions to consolidate terminal space, and the further decision to
invest very large sums in new equipment by both operators, might be seen
to mark the beginning of a new phase in container handling in the port.  At
least, the constraints on productivity imposed by inefficient equipment will
be alleviated.
• Problems associated with the regional trade mix and ship-handling:
Both terminal operators have pointed to the difficulty of negotiating
Enterprise Agreements with a workforce that has traditionally worked in
both general cargo handling and in container handling operations,
sometimes over the same or adjacent berth areas.  Bulk handling and
general cargo handling operations have been characterised by a very high
variability in demand  -  which may require a relatively small core
workforce with the ability to add Supplementary labour as required.
Container handling, on the other hand, has tended to require a larger core
workforce and a relatively smaller number of Supplementaries.  Issues
relating to the ability to interchange labour, the measurement of
performance, inequality in the conditions of work and in rewards have
therefore posed problems not common in terminal-only workforces.  We
have not pursued these issues; or the extent to which Enterprise
Agreements should be separately negotiated with 'separate' groups for
conventional cargo or container operations or whether or not one
Agreement may be appropriate.
• Problems associated with ship presentation:  Terminal operators pointed
not only to the productivity impacts of split-terminal operations and
inefficient equipment but also to the problems associated with poor ship
presentation.  In some cases this referred to poor stowage and difficult hold
configurations; and in others it related to the problems of restowing and
sorting of containers either prior to or after other port calls in Australia and
Productivity of Australian Container Terminals: Some Critical Issues
Robinson & Everett
27
Fremantle's  status as a first port of call on entry/last port of call on exit.
Certainly, lower productivity on these vessels will reduce overall port
averages; and if prices have been set appropriately they will pay some
penalty for poor working.
5.3 Productivity Levels
What handling rates are being achieved at Fremantle's container terminals?
Table 5.1 provides some indication over 1994 and 1995 for one of the port's terminals
(P&O Ports).  The monthly average container (TEU) moves per hour was 20.72 in
1994 and 20.92 in 1995.
Table 5.1:  Selected productivity characteristics, P&O Ports Terminal,
Port of Fremantle 1994 and 1995
1994 1995
Month TEUs Vessel
Calls
Gross
TEUs p.h.
TEUs Container
s
Vessel
l Calls
Gross
TEUs p.h.
Container
Moves p.h.
January 7653 28 21.38 11041 8988 34 23.28 18.95
February 7234 23 20.64 9312 7769 30 20.18 16.84
March 9328 32 19.54 11901 9928 31 21.49 17.93
April 9818 34 19.81 10121 8575 32 22.30 18.89
May 9352 31 19.34 10970 8986 30 20.53 16.81
June 9673 34 20.23 9341 7773 31 20.36 16.16
July 9146 30 20.74 10418 8474 34 20.45 18.21
August 9271 32 21.60 11073 9201 32 21.98 19.21
September 8155 25 19.63 11753 9774 38 20.79 17.77
October 11949 33 21.68 9833 8140 29 20.29 16.80
November 10603 29 21.74 10908 8751 29 19.67 15.78
December 10359 30 22.33 11787 9606 33 19.71 16.07
Total 112541 361 128458 105965 383
Average 30 20.72 32 20.92 17.45
Ave TEUs
per vessel
call:
312 335
These figures are not strictly comparable with those for the CTAL Terminal in Port
Botany, noted in Table 3.1; but the month-by-month average value for container
moves per hour suggests that the Fremantle rates are somewhat higher than those
achieved at Port Botany.
For those vessels able to unload and load full loads of 500 to 600 containers in
Fremantle crane rates per hour are as high as 32 TEUs and may be as high as 27
containers per crane hour.  For other reasonably stowed vessels 145 container moves
per shift or over 20 container moves per crane hour in a 7 hour shift is more usual.  It
is arguable that, given the problems of old equipment and split berth operations and the
other problems noted above, these productivity outcomes are much better than we
might have expected!
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5.4 Conclusion:  Unique Solutions?
Productivity levels are a function of the particular organisational and operating and
other characteristics of the individual terminal or system; and meaningful comparisons
are with the terminal or system itself operating under different assumptions or rules or
practices.  We should not be at all surprised that handling rates at the Fremantle
terminals may differ from those in other ports  -  on any one day or over one month or
over one year.
On the other hand, we have also argued that there are underlying structural factors that
are a function of continuing rigidities in the labour market, and are now firmly
ensconced in Enterprise Agreements, that are powerful inhibitors of productivity
increases in Australian container terminals.
Fremantle terminals no less than other terminals are similarly constrained.  Overtime
and overtime loadings are central to the mechanisms for meeting variable demand; the
Order of Engagement similarly excludes Supplementary labour; and wages are a
function of time on the job, not of productivity.
The strategies for achieving higher productivity in Fremantle terminals will be those
common to achieving higher productivity in all Australian terminals; and they will be
based on overcoming these problems.
But we underline a critical point that we have raised earlier about the PEP scheme; and
it is that if there are to be effective and sustainable increases in productivity they will
derive from a detailed understanding of the uniqueness of individual terminals in the
light of the underlying determinants of productivity and terminal efficiency.
6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Enterprise Agreements Have Not Delivered?
Why is it that, after an intensive and expensive process of waterfront reform container
terminal productivity remains low  -  and much lower than it ought to be or than we
might expect?  The Inter-State Commission made much of the need to create a
competitive market; and the conventional wisdom was, and remains, that competitive
restructuring of the market (or markets) would deliver productivity and efficiency
gains.  Central to the reform process, then, was the creation of enterprise employment;
and the negotiation of Enterprise Based Agreements (EBAs) or Enterprise Agreements
(EAs) between employer and employees, unions and the ACTU.  But five years down
the track the new framework offered by EBAs is simply not delivering industry-
acceptable productivity.
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Why is it so?  What are the underlying reasons?  Is change possible?  And, if so, what
sort of change?
6.2 Persistent Rigidities
Porter has argued that
• the structure of an industry  -  'its underlying economic and technical
characteristics'  -  and
• how firms position themselves in that industry will determine how effectively
firms will compete in the industry  -  and how efficient and productive they may
be.
On the one hand enterprise employment, at least theoretically, removes monopoly
control of labour; and on the other, again theoretically, it provides the opportunity for
the firm to exert control over its labour inputs  -  in terms of numbers, conditions,
organisation and so on.  In short, it allows a firm to seek competitive advantage over
other firms.  For firms in the container terminals market, and in stevedoring generally,
such an ability to control labour resources is critical given the day-to-day need to meet
a highly variable demand  -  of ships, cargo, truck and rail traffic.  The new EBA
framework, set in place by the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA), might
then be expected to reflect this new competitive structuring.
Not so; in fact it has handed the industry a double whammy.  Not only does monopoly
power continue to exist in the labour market but also labour market rigidities are now
firmly ensconced in the EBAs  -  in effect the operating rules for the enterprises.
6.3 Why EBAs (or EAs) Lock In Low Productivity
How, in fact, do current EBAs for container terminal stevedoring firms lock in low
productivity?  What is it in the EBA framework that prevents an efficient and effective
allocation of resources to terminal operations?  How do firms deal with the problem of
variable demand under existing EBAs?
The short answer is that Overtime and Overtime Loadings (or Penalty Rates) are the
key elements in current strategies for meeting variable demand.
They result from
• corporate policies in the post-WIRA period which have set strict limits to the
number of Permanents in the workforce;
• Union policies which, through the Order of Engagement, have set strict limits to
the amount of labour that can be supplied as Supplementary or casual labour;
and have created a preferential system that places Permanents ahead of other
labour classifications for Overtime; and
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• a wage structuring mechanism that rewards overtime more than Productivity and
that creates wages as a function of time spent on the job, not of productivity.
Thus
Wage  =  Shift Loading  +  Overtime Loading  +  Productivity Bonus
The outcomes are, among other things
• long hours of work  -  since Overtime is more highly rewarded than productivity;
• low productivity  -  since the rewards are high for consuming time taken to
complete a task; and
• very high wages  -  which reflect the relatively high Overtime Loadings and the
number of Overtime shifts involved.
6.4 Is There A Better Way?
Terminal operators are reluctant to add labour since
• it adds significantly to fixed costs;
• under current conditions it is difficult for firms to adjust downards their
Permanent workforce; and
• it does not overcome the problem of defining wages as a function of time spent
on the job.
Nor are Unions willing to substitute Supplementaries for Permanent labour since
• there is a desire to see the waterfront serviced by permanent, skilled staff in a
stable work environment; and
• some supplementaries are former employees and are seen to be gaining an unfair
financial advantage (since they have already accepted redundancy packages).
The key is to substitute higher productivity for Overtime  -  and hence higher rewards
for productivity.  It is to make wages a function of productivity, not of time.
The CTAL Productivity Employment Proposal  -  or PEP scheme  -  is an attempt to
embrace these principles.  In effect, it sets
Wage  =  Average Weekly Rate (AWR)  +  Productivity Loading
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in which the AWR is a guaranteed baseload wage, adjusted for different skill levels and
the Productivity Loading provides substantial rewards for performance at industry-
acceptable levels of 24 containers per crane hour and truck handling times of 20
minutes.  Higher rewards result from even higher shift productivities.
In fact, however, the wage equation will still contain an overtime component.  It will
be significantly reduced and will provide the 'safety net' that terminals will require
under particular demand conditions.  But strict requirements may need to be set in
place to ensure that overtime payments are not manipulated to reduce productivity
and/or inflate wage levels.
The scheme is not without its difficulties ;  but it is a significant attempt not only to
increase productivity but also to do so by dealing with some of the rigidities which
impose constraints on competitive efficiency.
We register a note of caution here; and it is that, although the underlying principles of
the PEP scheme suggest that it has relevance for other ports or terminals it is
imperative that each be assessed as a unique operation and this uniqueness will
determine the appropriate wage, revenue and profit outcomes.  The Scheme has been
designed specifically for high throughput terminals; but in regional ports in which there
is likely to be a relatively large proportion of idle time the 'no collection' characteristics
of the Scheme may require extensive modification.
6.5 The Central Finding
The central finding of this project, and of overriding importance, is
• that any substantial and sustainable increase in stevedoring productivity at
container terminals will only result, under present industrial relations conditions,
from major reformulation of Enterprise Agreements in such a way as to ensure
that productivity is more highly rewarded than time spent on the job.
6.6 Other Findings
The Terms of Reference of this project, commissioned by the Western Australian
Department of Transport, invited special comments relevant to the Western Australian
experience and, of course, to the Port of Fremantle.
6.6.1 Productivity at terminals in the Port of Fremantle:  We have found that
a number of particular conditions have impacted on productivity at the Fremantle
terminals including
• significant alienation of the workforce and Government  -  and by association the
workforce and management  -  through 1995 as a result of disputes associated
with the attempted introduction of new stevedoring operations, the operation of
Stateships and the CRA-related labour issues.  Regrettably, these actions  -  quite
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beyond any terminal-related productivity issues and outside management control
-  have provided a culture of confrontation that will take some time to change.
• the use of old and, in some cases, inefficient equipment;
• operation on unconsolidated terminal and berth space;
• operations that mix general cargo and container handling; and
• the poor presentation of vessels;
but it has also found
• that, given these particular difficulties, strategies for achieving higher
productivity in Fremantle terminals will also be those common to achieving
higher productivity in other Australian terminals.
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The PEP Scheme was formally introduced at the Sydney terminal in late February; on
March 2 a new Coalition Government replaced an existing Labor Government; and in
late March P&O Ports announced that a new Enterprise Agreement concluded with
employees at the Fremantle terminal.
This Report was substantially completed before these events - each likely to have
important implications for productivity; but at Appendix 3 we have added a description
of the new Enterprise Agreement, implemented from April 22, at the P&O Ports
terminal in Fremantle.
                                              
NOTES
Productivity of Australian Container Terminals: Some Critical Issues
Robinson & Everett
33
                                                                                                                                 
1 See BIE (1995), Waterfront 1995, International Benchmarking, AGPS  -
"As Australia's traded industries become more exposed to the pressures of international
competition there is an increasing need for infrastructure services (sic) to be supplied on
an internationally competitive basis.  In the absence of market forces, performance
benchmarks can be used to promote productivity improvements", p.iii.
2 Michael Porter argues this case in seeking to understand th e economic well-being of nations as well as
firms  -
"The search for a convincing explanation of both national and firm prosperity must begin
by asking the right question.  We must abandon the whole notion of a "competitive
nation" as a term having much meaning for economic prosperity.  The principal
economic goal of a nation is to produce a high and rising standard of living for its
citizens.  The ability to do so depends not on the amorphous notion of "competitiveness"
but on the productivity with which a nation's resources ( labour and capital) are
employed.  Productivity is the value of the output produced by a unit of labour or capital.
It depends on both the quality and features of products (which determine the prices they
can command) and the efficiency with which they are produced".
Porter, ME (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, London, p.6.
3 A number of reports are available detailing productivity measures for Australian (and in some cases,
overseas) ports.  See for example
BIE (1993), International Performance Indicators:  Waterfront, Research Report 47, AGPS, Canberra.
BIE (1995), op.cit.
BTCE (1995), Review of the Waterfront Industry Programme, Report 91, AGPS.
BTCE (1995), Waterline, No 4, October.
Centre for Transport Policy Analysis (1993), Australia New Zealand Direct Line and Waterfront Reform:
Impacts and Implications, The University of Wollongong.
PSA (1995), Monitoring of Stevedoring Costs and Charges and Terminal Handling Charges, No 5,
Report No 26, Melbourne.
WIRA (1992), Final Report, October, Canberra.
WIRA (1992), Performance Indicators, September, Canberra.
4 See BTCE, Waterline, No 4, October 1995.  See also,
BTCE (1995), Review of the Waterfront Industry Reform Programme, Report 91, AGPS, Chapter 3.
Note, however, that some terminals have shown continuing improvements in productivity.  The Conaust
terminal at Fremantle, for example, has shown productivity improvements every year since the initial
EBA was instituted in November 1991.
5 Inter-State Commission (1989), Waterfront Investigation, Conclusions and Recommendations, AGPS,
pxvii.
6 ibid., pxviii.
7 ibid., p144.
8 See Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (1992), Final Report, October, Attachment A.
The Authority was set up in July 1989 ; and the In-Principle Agreement (IPA) was '... negotiated between
the Stevedoring Employers and Unions and the ACTU under the auspices of the Waterfront Industry
Reform Authority ...  The IPA formally came into effect on 1 November 1989 and ended on 31 October
Productivity of Australian Container Terminals: Some Critical Issues
Robinson & Everett
34
                                                                                                                                 
1992'.
9 See Porter, ME (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, London, Chapter 2.
10 ibid., p40.
11 See Centre for Transport Policy Analysis (1986), Truck Delays and Container Terminal Operations:
CTAL Terminal, September-November 1984, Summary Report to the Joint Working Party of the NSW
Cargo Facilitation Committee and the NSW Road Freight Industry Council.
12 ibid., p35.
13 See Centre for Transport Policy Analysis (1988), Economic Implications of Waterfront Industry
Structures, Report prepared for the Inter-State Commission.  Reprinted in
Inter-State Commission (1988), Waterfront Investigation, Preliminary Findings and Discussion Papers,
AGPS, Volume 4.
14 See Dick, H and Robinson, R (1992), 'Waterfront reform:  the next phase', Paper presented at the
National Agricultural and Resources Outlook Conference, ABARE, Canberra, p1.
Inter-State Commission (1989), op.cit., pxvi.
16 Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (1992), op.cit., p5.
17 This section of the report draws on a briefing paper, CTAL Productivity Employment Proposal (PEP),
and detailed statistical analysis kindly made available to the Centre by P&O Ports.  It also reflects
discussions with senior staff on a number of occasions.  The details of the scheme were those current at
the end of 1995.  Interpretations are, of course, those of the authors as are any errors or
misunderstandings.
Productivity of Australian Container Terminals: Some Critical Issues
Robinson & Everett
36
APPENDIX 1
The CTAL Productivity Scheme
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The CTAL Productivity Scheme
Outline of Scheme
The performance related productivity scheme is based on a threshold number of TEUs handled per
crane hour as calculated for all vessels over a period of one week.
The size of the bonus pool to be distributed is variable on a sliding scale reflecting:
§ Number of TEUs handled in the week
§ Crane hour performance rates
The minimum (threshold) performance rate for any bonus to be paid is 18 TEU per crane hour, labour
on to labour off vessel, averaged for all vessels over each week.
Who Participates
All employees from Stevedoring Industry Grade 2 to Grade 7 shall participate in the productivity
scheme.
Payment of Bonus Pool
Payment will be made weekly when the calculation of the previous week’s container handling
performance has occurred.
The sliding scale of payments is as follows:
PRODUCTIVITY SCHEME RATED
TeuS per
Crane
Hour
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Bonus ($)
per TEU
7.20 7.60 8.00 8.40 8.80 9.20 9.60 10.00 10.40 10.80 11.20 11.60 12.00
Distribution of Bonus Pool
The bonus pool will be distributed among employees on the basis of man shifts worked
during the week while ships were working.
      e.g. Total bonus pool for the week = $25,000
Total man shifts worked =  1,250
Bonus per man shift = 25,000
1,250   =   $20.00
Each employees’ share of the bonus pool will be the number of man shifts he worked during 
the week multiplied by the bonus per man shift.
      e.g. Man shift worked by employee = 5
Bonus per man shift = $20.00
Employees share of bonus pool = $100.00
Source:  CTAL Enterprise Agreement 1994-1996, p41
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APPENDIX 2
Variables used in the
CTAL simulation model
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The data on which the analysis was performed were as follows
• for each day over a period of 24 days
• for each shift  -  Midnight, Day and Evening
Vessel information
1. Name
2. Shifts alongside by day  and shift
3. Number of import containers exchanged
4. Number of export containers exchanged
5. Total number of containers exchanged
6. Total number of import containers exchanged
7. Total number of export containers exchanged
Receival and Delivery by Road
8. Imports
9. Exports
10. Total
11. Consolidation
12. Total containers in yard
Receival and Delivery by Rail
13. Received
14. Delivered
15. Total
16. Quarantine
17. Number of gantry cranes utilised
Labour Utilisation and Disposition (Numbers)
18. Ordinary Regulars
19. Ordinary Irregulars
20. Double headers
21. Supplementary
22. Overtime
23. Labour in
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24. Labour out
25. Idle time
26. Annual Leave
27. Sick Leave
28. Rostered Day Off
29. Rostered Week Off
30. Work care
31. Day in lieu
32. Long Service Leave
33. Other Leave
34. Unpaid leave
35. Training
36. Total establishment
37. Man Shifts Used
38. Excess/shortage of labour
39. Productive man shifts
40. Unproductive man shifts
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APPENDIX 3
The New P&O Ports
Fremantle Enterprise Agreement, 1996
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The following is the test of a Press Release from P&O Ports on 25 March 1996 and
describes the main characteristics of a new Enterprise Agreement.
“FREMANTLE ENTERPRISE AGREEMENT 1996
A new Enterprise Agreement has been agreed with P&O Ports employees at Fremantle
and is scheduled to be introduced on Monday 22 April 1996.
Some of the features of the Container Division Enterprise Agreement are as follows:
• The workforce will be split into the two P&O Ports Divisions, Bulk & General Cargo
Division and Container Division.
• The Container Division will have a dedicated workforce, including supervisors.
• There will be recruitment of Permanent Employees, Guaranteed Wage Employees
(GWEs), Supplementary Employee and Australian Vocational Trainees ( AVTs).  The
recruitment process has commended.
• A 14x1 roster will be introduced.  This involves extending each shift by half an hour
to 7-1/2 hours.  The additional half hour worked will count towards a week off after
working fourteen weeks.
• Shift times and working arrangements will change.  The shift times are:
• Day Shift 0700 - 1430
• Evening Shift 1415 - 2145
• Night shift 2130 - 0500
Note there is a 15 minute overlap between the day and evening shifts.  This is to allow
"hot seat changeovers" and work will not stop at the change of shift.
• It will be possible to work vessels nonstop from 0700-0500 the following morning.
• Road receivals and deliveries will commence at 0700 and continue to 2130.
Continuous receivals and deliveries will occur during the day shift and during shift
changeover.  The evening shift has traditionally been relatively quiet and meal breaks
will occur at 1645-1710 and 1915-1935.  However, if sufficient trucks regularly use
the evening shift, continuity will be arranged.
• When there is no following shift, day and evening shifts may be extended by one or
two hours for any reason.
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Night shifts may be extended one hour for the purpose of finishing a vessel or job.
• Double headers will be limited to two a week and  may not be worked on consecutive
days.
We expect the new EA to have a positive affect on our service levels and productivity, and
there will be a further significant improvement once consolidation has been completed.”
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